Home / Mid-East / Syria / How Putin Changed a Balance of Power Among Russia’s Elite (Op-Ed)

How Putin Changed a Balance of Power Among Russia’s Elite (Op-Ed)

Nikolai Petrov

As is mostly the case in Russia, the creation of the National Guard was prolonged anticipated, and therefore, held everybody by surprise.

The sheer scale of the restructuring has influenced many any bend of the siloviki. The Interior Ministry will remove many of its muscle: 170,000 interior troops, 50,000 special army and riot police, private confidence army as good as control over private confidence army and arms trafficking will all go to the National Guard.

In exchange, the Interior Ministry will accept 30,000 Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) personnel — though generals — and approximately the same series of staff from the Federal Migration Service (FMS). Both services have radically been disbanded and their directors marginalized.

Both Viktor Ivanov — former FDCS conduct and chief crew officer for President Vladimir Putin — and Konstantin Romodanovsky — former FMS head, Chekist and major actor in the Interior Ministry — are out of the picture.

In their place, Viktor Zolotov, who has been guarding Putin given the mid-1990s, has taken core stage. He will conduct a force that stands somewhere between a super-sized supervision organisation and a 400,000-strong comprehension service.

Observers are already explaining that Putin instituted this rare remodel as credentials for suppressing the mass protests that will fundamentally mangle out as the socio-economic conditions in the nation continues to decline.

This is partially true, and for that reason the authorities have been usually adding to the ranks of various demonstration military and rapid deployment forces.

But even some-more critical is the way this remodel has altered the balance of power among the Russian elite.

In fact, that change has shifted significantly over the past dual years, generally investing some-more energy in the siloviki — quite the FSB, army and Chechen personality Ramzan Kadyrov, who heads what is radically a separate siloviki structure in its possess right.

Now the all-powerful Russian boss will have a potent apparatus at his ordering that answers to no one though himself. It is a personal army unregulated as nonetheless by any law. But this pierce also levels the balance of power within the siloviki, in much the same approach as when Putin remade the FDCS into a arrange of second FSB in the mid-2000s. That put the two comprehension services into competition, origination it probable for Putin to rely on either one as the situation demanded, personification any opposite the other.

Oil prices have fallen, and along with them, the strength of the executive government. It is as if Russia has returned to the 1990s. And the arise of Viktor Zolotov bears distinguished parallels to the arise some-more than 20 years ago of Alexander Korzhakov, arch bodyguard to former-President Boris Yeltsin. When Yeltsin’s recognition strike stone bottom, Korzhakov advocated canceling presidential elections. However, he eventually mislaid out to former Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais and his organisation of reformers who argued that the election routine should proceed.

While there is small need to cancel presidential elections in 2018, Zolotov stays positioned to keep ensure over Putin’s revanchist interests.

Thus, the big winners in the origination of the National Guard are Putin, Zolotov, whose change has dramatically increased, and the whole presidential ensure headed by Yevgeny Murov. The losers embody all of the remaining siloviki: Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, FSB arch Alexander Bortnikov and, to some degree, both Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s many renouned minister, and Kadyrov, who “owns” the most absolute special army in the country.

Are the Russian people also among the losers? Definitely, inasmuch as this restructuring empowers the siloviki and Chekists, who now have a personal army in place of a hired army accountable to the public. Worse, an army contingency act: Putin’s force bottom has expanded, lifting the risk that military will use force not usually to put down protests, though the political routine in broader sense.

The increased foe between confidence army will many expected supplement vigour to the business community. After all, the National Guard is the new “protector” in the pole game, and it will find to obtain the protection income that businesses now compensate to other confidence forces.

But keep in mind that it is most easier to issue a presidential direct than to carry out restructuring. The scale of the changes Putin envisions is so good that they will take years to implement in a nation the size of Russia. And that means the siloviki will have something to do now besides simply expanding their ranks — that is, formulating a new hierarchy and clarifying the nature of their mutual relations.

Nikolai Petrov is a political analyst.

Article source: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/565755.html